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Abstract
The point of departure for this study is the pervasive ﬁnding that, other things equal, local jurisdic-
tions tend to spend more on local services the larger the fraction of renters among their residents. This
paper seeks to determine the approximate magnitude of this “renter effect” by posing the question
“How much smaller would local public budgets be if all residents were home-owners?” Making use
of two quite different approaches, the paper ﬁnds a typical renter effect on local public expenditure
on the order of ten percent. This ﬁnding suggests that we might do well to reform the administration
of the property tax so that changes in property tax liabilities on rental dwellings are directly and
visibly transformed into changes of monthly rental payments.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
In a public-choice framework, one of the basic functions of a good tax is to provide
visible and accurate signals to the electorate of the cost of public services. In this way, a
good tax functions much like a price in the private sector; it guides decisions, in this case
public decisions, toward efﬁcient outcomes. The literature, in fact, often makes reference
to the “tax-price” of public services to individual voters.
In terms of this criterion, the local property tax is often given good marks. At the level
of pure theory, for example, Bruce Hamilton [18] has shown that in a model with local
zoning, the property tax can function as a perfect beneﬁt tax that results in a fully efﬁcient
Tiebout outcome. Moreover, several students of local ﬁnance such as William Fischel [12]
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believe that the Hamilton–Tiebout model provides a good description of the functioning of
the local public sector in the United States. Extending the argument along another dimen-
sion in his recent book, Fischel [13] contends that, as a result of the capitalization of both
the beneﬁts from local public services and the associated tax liabilities into house prices,
a system of local property taxation encourages efﬁcient budgetary decisions by local resi-
dents. But even at a less formal level, many of us feel that the property tax is, on the whole,
a good local tax, in part because of its visibility.1
However, this line of argument appears more compelling for the case of homeowners
than for renters. Occupants of rental dwellings do not pay the tax directly; the legal tax
liability rests with landlords. While there is some reason to believe that property taxes
on rental units are shifted forward in the form of higher rents, it is nevertheless the case
that renters never see a tax bill.2 Moreover, there is some indirect, but pervasive, evidence
suggesting that renters don’t think that they pay local property taxes. This has led to the
claim that there is a “renter illusion” associated with the tax [25]. If this is true, and, as we
shall see, there is some persuasive evidence in support of a “renter effect,” then property-
tax ﬁnance may lead to inefﬁcient budgetary decisions in the local public sector. If renters
believe that they don’t have to pay for local public services, they will tend to support
excessively large public budgets; as a result, we might expect overspending in the local
public sector.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the validity of this claim in the light of a large
body of econometric evidence that comes from efforts to estimate demand functions for
local public goods. I shall do two things here. First, I try to reach a rough estimate of the
magnitude of the renter-effect on local public spending. More speciﬁcally, I attempt to an-
swer the question “How much smaller would local public spending in the United States
be if every household owned its own home?” Second, I will discuss some measures for
reform of the local property tax to remedy this deﬁciency. One approach (and one with
some historical precedent) would be to limit the privilege of voting on budgetary measures
to property owners. But there are fundamental economic, as well as basic democratic, ob-
jections to this solution. An alternative would be simply to send tax bills directly to renters
instead of to landlords. This may complicate the administration of the tax somewhat, but
it would probably improve its performance in encouraging efﬁcient decision-making on
public budgets. More on this later.
1. The evidence on renter behavior: an overview
Beginning with the seminal papers by Thomas Borcherding and Robert Deacon [6] and
Theodore Bergstrom and Robert Goodman [3], a large econometric literature has evolved
that seeks to estimate demand functions for local public services. These studies begin with
a sample of local jurisdictions for which we have observed ﬁscal outcomes. They then as-
sociate the outcome in each jurisdiction with the demand of a particular resident (often the
1 For a recent and useful collection of papers on property taxation and local government ﬁnance, see Oates [27].
2 For a careful theoretical treatment of the shifting of property taxes on renters, see Robert Carroll and John
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median-voter). This approach thus generates a set of observations, consisting of points on
individual demand curves, from which we can estimate econometrically a generic demand
function for local services.3
In the course of estimating these demand equations, researchers specify a set of control
variables that typically have included (among other things) the fraction of residents that
own their own homes. And time and again, the ﬁnding emerges that, other things equal, the
larger the fraction of renters in a community, the higher the level of local public spending
(per capita). This is the phenomenon that I am calling “the renter effect.”
In the next section, we will investigate this ﬁnding more carefully and, in particular,
shall try to reach some kind of rough estimate of the magnitude of the renter effect from
existing econometric studies. But I should note further that there are other kinds of stud-
ies that also ﬁnd such a renter effect. Gil DeBartolo and Peter Fortune [9], in a study of
municipal bond referenda in Ohio, found that the proportion of renters in a community
is positively and signiﬁcantly related to the likelihood of passage of a bond issue. They
conclude from their study that “...rentersandeducated voters are more likely to support
an expansion of public services than are home-owners and less educated voters” (p. 59).
Likewise, Jorge Martinez-Vasquez [22] notes that in a series of bond referenda in St Louis
in 1974 for increased spending on a range of local services (including police, ﬁre, parks,
highways, and libraries), renters were much more supportive than were home-owners. On
each proposal, the percentage of “yes” votes at the precinct level was positively and signif-
icantly related to the percentage of renters. Finally, Mickey Levy [20], in an econometric
study of voting behavior on two referenda in California, found that renters were signiﬁ-
cantly (in a statistical sense) less likely to vote “yes” on Proposition 13 which restricted
levels of property taxation.4
There is thus a substantial and compelling body of evidence that associates the presence
of renters with higher levels of local public spending. But this requires careful interpre-
tation. The conventional response has been to attribute renter support for larger public
budgets to a form of ﬁscal illusion, the erroneous perception on the part of renters that
they face a zero (or very low) tax-price for local services. But as some have argued, this
perception may not be in error; it may be the case that property taxes are not fully and ex-
peditiously shifted forward onto renters or that, for other reasons, they face a relatively low
tax-price. Martinez-Vazquez [22], for example, argues that renters do, in fact, obtain larger
net beneﬁts from local services so that their tendency to support increased public spending
is indeed quite rational (see also Martinez-Vasquez and David Sjoquist [23]). Ellen Roche
[31] and Robert Carroll and John Yinger [8] provide further support for this view with
evidence that property taxes are, to a substantial extent, not shifted forward onto renters.
There is thus a real issue as to whether renter support of expanded local expenditure is the
result of illusion or whether it is a rational response to a low tax-price (or perhaps some
combination of the two). What I want to emphasize is that this issue is not really germane
to this paper. My concern here is the propensity of renters to think for whatever reason
(imagined or real) that they pay a very low (perhaps zero) tax-price for local public ser-
3 For a more detailed description and assessment of this literature, see Daniel Rubinfeld [33] and Oates [26].
4 However, as a referee suggested to me, this may be explained in part by the presence on the ballot of Propo-
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vices. Thus, I shall not refer in this paper to “renter illusion” but to the “renter effect.” The
question of interest here is “How large is the renter effect on local public expenditure?” To
this matter, we turn now.
2. The magnitude of the renter effect: an extrapolation from existing econometric
ﬁndings
One way to get some sense of the magnitude of the renter effect is simply to take the
estimatesfromtheeconometricliteratureoftheimpactofthehome-ownervariableonlocal
public expenditure and extrapolate to a case of complete home-ownership. For example,
most of these studies estimate a spending equation in log-linear form, where the dependent
variable is the logarithm of public expenditure (on some category of spending) and the
relevant independent variable is the percentage of residents who own their own home.
A typical equation from this literature is thus of the form:
lnE = a0 +a1lnN +a2lnt +a3lnY +

aiXi, (1)
where E is municipal spending on a speciﬁed class of local public services, N is popula-
tion, t is the tax-price of the median voter, Y is the income of the median voter, and the Xi
constitute a vector of “taste” variables that include (among others) the percentage of resi-
dents that own their own homes.5 If we know the fraction of home-owners in the sample
(say 60 percent), we can simply multiply the estimated coefﬁcient by 40 to determine the
predicted percentage decrease in local spending for the case of complete home-ownership.
Table 1 presents a substantial list of studies, several of which estimate a series of expen-
diture equations for different samples and different categories of expenditure. I summarize
the nature and ﬁndings of these studies in the table.6 In the far right column, there ap-
pears a calculation of the implied percentage decrease in spending that would occur if all
renters were to become home-owners. As indicated above, this is a simple extrapolation
from the observed composition of the community to our hypothetical case of 100 percent
home-ownership.7
The estimates of the renter effect based on the extrapolations in Table 1 vary widely.
They range all the way from about 7 percent to over 40 percent. There is clearly no
5 Again, see Rubinfeld [33] and/or Oates [26] for more on all this.
6 I present in the table only a selection from the many equations that some of these studies report. I have
tried in such cases to select representative results for the study. There are, incidentally, a few studies that have
not found a statistically signiﬁcant renter effect; see Gary Reid [29] and Robert Schwab and Ernest Zampelli
[36]. There have also been some such studies outside the United States. Paul Rothstein [32] ﬁnds some evidence
that the percentage of renters is positively associated with local public spending in Japanese prefectures, but
Bruno Heyndels and Carine Smolders [19] are unable to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant renter effect in their study of Flemish
municipalities. This may reﬂect the fact that Flemish municipalities rely less heavily on property taxation than
most American local governments.
7 In some instances, the studies do not report the mean value in the samples of the percentage of home-owners
to give us our initial position. In such cases, I have used the “home-ownership rate” from the closest census year
and geographic region as a proxy. The home-ownership rate, incidentally, ranges from about 60 to 65 percent for
the US as a whole over the relevant period.W.E. Oates / Journal of Urban Economics 57 (2005) 419–431 423
Table 1
Study Sample Function Extrapolated
renter effect
(1) Beck [1] CA mun. Gen. Exp. 15.5
(2) Bergstrom and Goodman [3] US mun. Gen. Exp. 29.3
" US mun. Police Exp. 42.7
" US mun. Parks and Rec. 29.7
(3) Bogart [5] NJ mun. Public-Works Exp. 26.6
(4) Brazer and McCarty [7] CT sch. dst. School Exp. 14.7
"N J s c h . d s t . " 7 .4
"V A s c h . d s t . " 1 8 .4
" CT mun. Mun. Exp. 31.1
" NJ mun. " 14.1
" VA mun. " 7.9
(5) Deno and Mehay [10] US mun. Total Exp. I 24.3
" US mun. Total Exp. II 37.6
" US mun. Police Exp. 32.6
" MI–OH mun. Total Exp. I 15.9
" MI–OH mun. Total Exp. II 23.4
" MI–OH mun. Fire Prot. Exp. 34.6
(6) Ferris [11] US cities Total Exp. 33.7
" " Gen. Exp. 27.6
(7) Gonzales, Means, and Mehay [14] CA mun. Police Exp. 21.1
(8) Gronberg [17] IL mun. Mun. Exp. 10.9
(9) Lovell [21] CT sch. dst. Exp. per Pupil 7.9
(10) Megna and Lee [24] WI sch. dst . Exp. per Pupil 14.4
(11) Peterson [28] CA sch. dst. Exp. per Pupil 14.9
"M I s c h . d s t . " 8 .4
"N J s c h . d s t . " 1 1 .3
"N Y s c h . d s t . " 2 1 .6
(12) Santerre [34] CT sch. dst. Exp. per Pupil 10.2
" CT mun. Mun. Exp. 14.1
(13) Sass [35] CT mun. Mun. Exp. 25.8
" CT sch.dts. Sch. Exp. 26.5
non-arbitrary way of picking a single representative number to characterize these ﬁnd-
ings. A simple average of the numbers in this column, for example, is 21.1 percent. But
the results certainly convey the sense of a very large renter effect: they suggest that the
presence of renters in a community is “typically” associated with an elevation of public
spending on the order, perhaps, of 20 percent or more. This is a big effect, so large perhaps
as to strain its credibility!8
There are, however, at least two good reasons to be uneasy over accepting these ﬁndings
uncritically. First, there is an obvious problem of misspeciﬁcation here. As Judith Roberts
[30] pointed out some time ago, the striking differences in home-owner and renter support
8 Theextrapolationestimatesalsohintatsomesystematicdifferencesbyfunction.Inparticular,theextrapolated
renter effect seems typically smaller for school spending than for other categories of local public expenditure.
Perhaps this reﬂects the fact that renter households have, on average, fewer children than owner-occupied units
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for budgetary measures suggest that it is probably necessary to estimate separate demand
equations for the two groups (something she carried out in her dissertation). In particular,
simply adding on a “taste variable” indicating the fraction of residents who are home-
owners is not a satisfactory way to address this matter.
Second, there is the matter of far-reaching extrapolations. The coefﬁcient estimates for
the home-owner variable indicate the magnitude of the effect in the vicinity of the sample
means, typically 60 to 65 percent of residents. It takes a substantial leap of faith to extrap-
olate this measured impact to an extreme value of the variable, namely 100 percent, that
lies far outside the range of observed values.
In fact, there is a compelling reason for believing that such extrapolations have an in-
herent upward bias. In the appendix to this paper, I set forth a framework that shows that
the marginal effect on public spending of reducing the percentage of renters diminishes as
the fraction of renters becomes small. Thus, extrapolating the marginal effect over a large
range gives rise to substantial overestimates of the renter effect. In the appendix, I ﬁnd
that for a typical case from Table 1 the extent of the overestimation from the extrapolation
procedure is roughly 40 percent.
If we take from Table 1 a “typical” value of the renter effect based on extrapolations
of, say, 20 percent, and then apply a 40 percent correction, we ﬁnd that we have a rough
estimate of the renter effect of about 12 percent, or, so as not to imply such a high degree
of precision, let us say on the order of 10 to 15 percent. This I will take as a “ballpark
estimate” from the “corrected-extrapolation” approach.
This exercise thus provides some evidence of a sizeable renter effect. But it would be
reassuring to ﬁnd an alternative method for estimating its magnitude. To this, we turn next.
3. An alternative approach: a conceptual experiment
Suppose that we construct a hypothetical, prototypical community made up entirely of
home-owners. We then characterize their demands for spending on local public services;
this yields a distribution of demands for local expenditure. Making use of the standard
median-voter model, we can describe the equilibrium level of spending as the median of
the desired levels of spending in our distribution. The experiment consists of converting
about one-third of the residents to renters with a perceived tax-price for local services of
zero. The comparative-statics exercise leads to a new median-voter outcome which can
be compared with the initial one. The percentage increase in the median level of desired
spending will then give us a “representative” measure of the magnitude of the renter effect.
To carry out this conceptual experiment, we need ﬁrst a given distribution of demands
for local spending. Fortunately, we don’t have to invent this out of thin air. Based on data
from a series of telephone interviews with individual households in the state of Michigan,
a group of public-ﬁnance economists have estimated some “micro-based” demand func-
tions for local public expenditure (in some cases for education and in others for municipal
spending).9 Among other things, these estimated demand functions produce a predicted
9 For a careful description of the methodology underlying these “micro-based” demand functions, see
Bergstrom et al. [4]. Rubinfeld [33] also presents an extended treatment of this approach and the basic ﬁndings.W.E. Oates / Journal of Urban Economics 57 (2005) 419–431 425
level of desired spending for each household. Thus, they produce just what we need for
our conceptual experiment: a distribution of desired levels of local expenditure.
Moreover, these data have two appealing properties for our purposes. First, the Michi-
gan survey was limited to home-owners. Thus, the estimated demand functions and our
distribution of desired level of expenditures relates to a set of households consisting en-
tirely of owner-occupants. Second, the data are grouped by local jurisdiction. We are not
working with a statewide sample, but rather with separate groups of households who have
chosen to live together in the same municipality (or, in some cases, county).
More speciﬁcally, I have taken the data from a study by Edward Gramlich and Daniel
Rubinfeld [16] in which they estimate demand functions for the level of municipal spend-
ing in various local jurisdictions in Michigan. In one part of the study, they provide infor-
mation on mean levels of expenditure and the variance of desired spending for a group of
426 households in the Detroit metropolitan area, where the data are grouped by the speciﬁc
local jurisdictions within the metropolitan area (see their Table 4 on p. 553).
Using these data, I construct our hypothetical community’s distribution of desired
spending in the following way. I take as the mean for this distribution the mean value
of actual per-capita spending in the three counties comprising the Detroit metropolitan
area for 1977; this gives us a mean value for our distribution of desired spending per capita
of $845. If we assume the distribution to be (approximately) normal, then we need only
its variance to conduct our conceptual experiments. To obtain a “representative” variance,
I have computed an observation-weighted average of the variances for the jurisdictions in
their Table 4. This gives a variance of $5872 or a standard deviation of about $77.
Armed with these parameter values, let us now conduct two conceptual experiments. In
each of them, we shall convert one-third of the households in our prototypical community
to renters. We do this by changing their tax-price to zero, which effectively moves them
into the right-hand tail of the distribution.10 We shall then relocate the median voter and
determine the increase in the median of the desired levels of public spending.
But ﬁrst we must specify where the renters are located within the initial distribution. For
our ﬁrst experiment, we simply assume that the distribution of renter demands is identical
to that of home-owners. Thus, we are simply removing one-third of the households from
each point of the distribution and shifting them to the right-hand tail. This implies that,
relative to the original distribution, we have moved the decisive, median voter from the
50th percentile to the 75th percentile. From the normal distribution, we ﬁnd that this means
that spending would rise by 0.675 standard deviations or about $52 per capita—an increase
of 6.2 percent in local public expenditure.
However, this may understate somewhat the change, since we might expect renters to
have lower demands for public spending than home-owners. The incomes of renters, for
instance, are signiﬁcantly lower on average than those of owner-occupants.11 In view of
this, let us make the extreme assumption that all renters have demands for public services
10 Roberts [30], in a careful and extensive econometric study, ﬁnds that the “perceived price” by renters for local
services is virtually zero, which provides some empirical support for this strong assumption. Alternatively, we
can take this procedure as providing an upper limit to the magnitude of the renter effect produced in this exercise.
11 In 1992, for example, the median income of occupants of rental units was $20,731 as compared to $38,088
for households that own their own homes.426 W.E. Oates / Journal of Urban Economics 57 (2005) 419–431
that are below the median of the desired level of spending in the original distribution.
In this second conceptual experiment, we are thus taking a third of the distribution from
below the initial median and shifting them to the right-hand tail. This implies that the
new median voter will be at the 83.3 percentile of the original distribution. Note that this
effectively provides us with an upper-bound under this approach for the magnitude of
the renter effect on local public spending. We ﬁnd in this case that the increase in the
desired level of spending by the median voter is 0.965 standard deviations—or an increase
of about $74 from $845 to $919. This represents an increase in desired spending of 8.8
percent.
The critical parameterfor these experimentsis the variance in the desired levelof spend-
ing across households. The standard deviation of about $77 derived from Gramlich and
Rubinfeld may appear to some as on the low side. But this is unclear. Especially if there
is a Tiebout-sorting process taking place, we might expect a relatively small variance in
desired spending within communities. However, the way in which the information was
collected may be slanted towards a small variance. Households were asked in telephone
surveys, not for desired levels of spending, but whether they wished changes in spending
(up or down) or would prefer no change. It may well be in such a context that there is a
tendency toward a response involving maintaining the status quo. If this is true, then there
may be some understatement of the variance in demands and hence an underestimate of
the renter effect.
There is, however, a potential source of bias that works in the opposite direction. As
is well known and documented, renters tend to be less active in local public life than
homeowners [13, pp. 80–81]. In particular, they vote with lower frequency on local is-
sues (including budgetary measures) than do owner-occupants. The conceptual experiment
in this section has given equal weight to the preferences of each resident, whether a renter
or homeowner. But to the extent that renter preferences have a lesser impact on local bud-
getary outcomes than those of owner-occupants, the calculations of the renter effect in our
experiments will tend to overstate somewhat the magnitude of the renter effect.12
The two approaches used in this paper provide support for the existence of a sizeable
renter effect. The estimated magnitudes admittedly differ between the two methods: the
corrected extrapolation approach points to a somewhat larger effect of renters on local
public spending than does our conceptual experiment using a representative, hypothetical
community. And I see no fully unambiguous resolution of the puzzle. But it does not seem
unreasonable to take as an estimate of the renter effect a ﬁgure at the low end of the cor-
rected extrapolation approach and at the high end of our conceptual experiment of, say, ten
percent.
12 Suppose, to take a fairly extreme case, that all homeowner residents inﬂuence local budgetary decisions as
compared to only half of renters. Then our conceptual experiments would yield renter effects on local public
spending of 2.0 and 4.0 percent respectively for the two cases in the text. This phenomenon, incidentally, should
not impart any sort of bias to the estimates from the earlier corrected-extrapolation approach. Any differential
behavior between renters and owners is presumably embodied in the estimated coefﬁcients, for they are based on
actual (rather than hypothetical) outcomes.W.E. Oates / Journal of Urban Economics 57 (2005) 419–431 427
4. On policy implications
With local public spending in the United States running over $1 trillion per year, a
renter effect on the order of 10 percent implies an elevation of local expenditure of over
$100 billion per annum. How should we regard this?
There is little reason to expect the renter effect to reﬂect a systematically higher
level of demand for public services by renters than by owner-occupants. Indeed, as Ellen
Roche [31] points out, the demands of renters, if anything, are likely to be lower than those
of home-owners, since renters have, on average, lower incomes and smaller family-size.
The most obvious and plausible explanation is that renters support larger local budgets be-
cause they don’t think they cost them much (if anything). From this perspective, we can
reasonably regard the renter effect as representing excessive public spending.13
How might we address this distortion in local public budgets stemming from property-
tax ﬁnance? One response would be simply to exclude renters from the budget-determina-
tion process. Indeed, there are historical precedents for limiting voting on local budgetary
matterstolocalpropertyowners.However,thereareobviouslypersuasivepoliticalgrounds
in a democratic society for objecting to such exclusion. In addition, there are good eco-
nomic reasons for taking exception to such a proposal. Renters are members of the commu-
nity, and they consume public services, just like owner-occupants. Thus, their preferences,
along with those of home-owners, should ﬁgure in the process of determining levels of
public outputs. To base decisions on the preferences of a subset of the community will
itself lead to inefﬁcient outcomes.
A more appealing way to reform the budgetary process is to ﬁnd some way to confront
renters with the appropriate tax-price for local services. If the source of this problem is
indeed ﬁscal illusion, this could be accomplished by simply shifting the legal liability for
thepropertytaxfromlandlordstotenants.Renterswouldthusreceivetaxbillsforthelevies
due on their units in the same way as owner-occupants. This reform would, however, come
at some cost in that it would complicate the administration of the tax. It is clearly easier, for
example, for the tax collector to assess the value of an entire apartment complex and collect
the requisite taxes from the owner than to make assessments and undertake collection from
each tenant in the building.
Alternatively, leases could take a form under which landlords would automatically ap-
portion any tax increases (or decreases) and immediately pass them forward in increased
(or reduced) rents to tenants. Such rental contracts with “escalation clauses” are a fairly
common practice for commercial leases. Under “net leases” (for example, “triple net leas-
es”), a basic rental payment is speciﬁed to which is added any applicable tax payments
(and, perhaps, the cost of utilities and other speciﬁed expenses). Under such a system,
tenantswouldbeassuredthatanyincreasesinspendingforlocalpublicprogramswouldre-
ﬂect themselves systematically and expeditiously in their monthly rental payments. There
clearly are some interesting options here that could make the “tax-price” of local public
13 There is a substantial literature on the median-voter model and its relationship to efﬁcient budgetary out-
comes. While the median-voter outcome is not, in general, perfectly efﬁcient, there are reasons to believe that
it may typically come reasonably close to efﬁciency. See, for example, Theodore Bergstrom [2] and Donald
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services more visible to occupants of rental units; such reforms could contribute to more
efﬁcient decision-making on local budgets.14
These potential reforms of the tax administration process (aside from excluding renters
altogether from the budget-determination process) rest, of course, on the premise that the
source of the renter effect is a form of ﬁscal illusion. If property taxes are not, in fact,
shifted to renters, then things become more complicated. One of the basic principles of
the theory of taxation is that the incidence of a tax is independent of whether the tax is
levied on the buyer or seller of a good. Thus, under perfect information and certain other
conditions, if the tax is not, in fact, shifted forward when it is levied on landlords, then it
will not be shifted forward if the legal liability is transferred to tenants. Tenants will realize
that any increments to their tax payments would be offset by lower rents. In this case, the
renter effect would presumably persist even if tax bills were sent to tenants.
This brings us back to the question of the precise source of the renter effect. This is
a hard question to answer, and it goes beyond the scope of this paper. In particular, to
distinguish between the ﬁscal illusion explanation and the incidence explanation (or some
combination of the two) would require a fully speciﬁed structural model along with a
rich body of micro-level data that explicitly differentiates between preferences of home
owners and renters. It presents a challenging and important task for further research. But,
apart from this issue, the existence of a renter effect, irrespective of its source, raises some
troubling issues concerning the efﬁciency of local budgetary decision-making.
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Appendix A. An estimate of the extrapolation bias
The simple extrapolation of public spending from the case of the existing percentage of
renters to one with no renters is highly suspect. But it turns out that we can say more than
this. Here I offer a method to estimate the extent of the bias; this approach suggests that,
for our particular case, simple extrapolation results in roughly a 40 percent overestimate of
the renter effect.
The basic rationale for the upward bias can be seen in terms of Fig. A.1. Let us suppose
that in a given community the demands for public spending (E) are normally distributed
14 As William Fischel pointed out to me, such visible shifting of tax increases into higher rents takes place under
certain systems of rent control; in such instances, landlords are allowed to increase controlled rents by the amount
of any tax increases. Thus, rather ironically, a system of rent controls could conceivably provide a more visible
set of tax-prices to residents and thereby contribute to better local ﬁscal decisions!W.E. Oates / Journal of Urban Economics 57 (2005) 419–431 429
Fig. A.1.
among home-owners. The familiar bell-shaped curve in the ﬁgure denotes this distribution.
Under the median-voter model, the equilibrium level of public spending would thus be OF
were the community composed solely of home-owners. But let us suppose next that the
community has rental occupants and that they constitute 35 percent of the residents (where
35 percent is a representative number from the various samples represented in Table 1).
If we assume that renters believe that they face a zero price for public services, then their
demands will be far up into the right-hand tail of the distribution. This implies that the
median voter in such a community will be the home-owner in the 77th percentile of the
homeowner distribution, which I have denoted as AB in the ﬁgure.15
Our objective is to determine the distance BF: this is the fall in the equilibrium level of
public spending if all renters become home-owners. I have tried to estimate BF by taking
an estimate of the marginal effect of a change in the percentage of renters and simply
multiplying this marginal effect by the entire renter population. Figure A.1 immediately
suggests that this is likely to generate an overestimate of the renter effect. Consider a one
percentage point shift in the population from renters to homeowners. In the ﬁgure, this is
represented by the area ABDC with a resulting fall in public spending of DB. Note that
our extrapolation technique involves simply multiplying DB by the percentage of renters
to get our estimate of the reduction in public spending when moving to an all-home-owner
community. But it is clear that as we move left under the curve, the same area will at each
step generate a smaller base—that is, the distance represented by DB will get smaller as
we move towards F. In other words, the impact on spending of a one percentage point shift
from renters to home-owners becomes less as the renter population becomes progressively
smaller. Thus, multiplying DB by the fraction of renters will give us an overestimate of our
desired quantity, BF.
Furthermore, we can determine the extent of this upward bias. With the normal distri-
bution, the distance in Fig. A.1 from point F to point B (from the 50th percentile to the
15 To see this, consider a community with a total population of 100 that consists of 65 homeowners and 35
renters. If the 35 renters are in the upper tail of the distribution, then we can locate our median voter as the
homeowner with the 15th highest demand among the homeowner population. This homeowner will be positioned
in the 77th percentile of the homeowner distribution of demands (i.e., 50/65).430 W.E. Oates / Journal of Urban Economics 57 (2005) 419–431
77th percentile) is 0.74 standard deviations (or 0.74σ). With our simple extrapolation, we
effectively take the change from the 77th percentile to the 76th percentile (which is 0.03σ)
and multiply it by 35, giving us a change in spending of 1.05σ. Our extrapolation estimate
is thus 1.42 times (i.e., 1.05σ/0.74σ) the desired quantity. Thus, we ﬁnd that the simple
extrapolationsappeartooverestimatethe equilibriumfall in spendingbyabout40 percent.
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